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I. INTRODUCTION
During World War II, the U.S. Government sought out contractors in the
name of “patriotism” to research and develop nuclear materials for this
country’s defense. Nearly seventy years later, we are still dealing with the
effects of that research. However, the issue of who should bear responsibility
for the long-term effects is still being argued. One of the major issues is
whether those contractors are allowed to raise the federal contractor defense.
The common law federal contractor defense arises out of basic principles
of governmental immunity. The defense protects government contractors from
liability for any harm arising out the performance of a government contract,
specifically in the areas of military and defense work, if the contractor was
following the government’s directions and the work performed was in an area
of “uniquely federal” concern.
The issue of application of federal contractor liability defense has most
recently been addressed in the Hanford litigation.  The Hanford litigation1
stems from the long-term effects of the production of plutonium in Hanford,
Washington by various contractors during World War Two. E.I. DuPont, a
corporate defendant in the Hanford litigation, attempted to utilize the
government contractor defense to seek dismissal from the suit. The Ninth
Circuit held that the Price-Anderson Act preempts the federal government
contractor defense and therefore E.I. DuPont could not be dismissed from the
Hanford litigation.
Following a brief overview of the Price-Anderson Act and the Hanford
litigation, this note will detail the weaknesses in the Ninth’s Circuit’s
reasoning regarding the application of the federal contractor defense. The
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federal contractor defense should be applied in the Hanford case because it
existed prior to the Price-Anderson Act’s 1988 amendments and does not
contradict the purpose of the Price-Anderson Act. Additionally, there are
serious issues with the nuclear industry that should be considered before
denying application of this defense to contractors like E.I. DuPont.
II. THE BIGGER PICTURE: WHY APPLICATION OF THIS DEFENSE IN THIS
CASE IS IMPORTANT
Nuclear energy is a hot topic in the United States today. With a new
emphasis on environmentalism, the issue will only become more prominent.
However, there are many obstacles in the way of pushing forward with this
environmentally friendly, carbon-free form of energy. Nuclear waste, funding,
heavy regulation, and public perception are all major players in the future of
nuclear energy.
The nuclear industry is one of the most highly regulated industries in the
country. The U.S. Department of Energy has ultimate responsibility for
regulating the nuclear industry through the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC).  Each year, the NRC awards about $80,000,000 in contracts to private2
entities.  However, the number of companies involved in the nuclear industry3
 is rather small. There are only 25 different operators of nuclear power
plants in the U.S. today.4
Even the courts that decided Hanford do not contest that the nuclear
industry is one of the most highly regulated industries in the country. The
Ninth Circuit clearly stated that “[i]t is not disputed that the federal
government is in charge of nuclear safety.”  The court also states that “‘the5
safety of nuclear technology [is] exclusively the business of the Federal
Government,’ which has ‘occupied the entire field of nuclear safety
concerns.’”  These assertions are not unfounded. There is a long history of6
regulation of the nuclear industry. The federal government made the first
developments in nuclear power and technologies.  It was not until 1954 that7
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the federal government encouraged civilian participation in the nuclear
industry under the Atomic Energy Act.  However, this Act did not give control8
to private companies as § 161 of the Atomic Energy Act vested all regulation
authority over the industry in an agency of the federal government, the Atomic
Energy Commission, and gave the Department of Energy the authority to set
radiation standards for nuclear power generators.  Later, in yet another attempt9
to encourage civilian participation in the industry, the Price-Anderson Act was
enacted to limit potential liability.10
To balance environmental concerns with the economic aspects of the
industry, the National Environmental Policy Act  was enacted in 1969 to11
enforce environmental regulations on the nuclear industry.  In 1974, Congress12
did away with the Atomic Energy Commission and created both the Energy
Research and Development Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, granting each different regulatory duties.  Finally, in 1980, the13
Nuclear Waste Policy Act was passed to address the problem of nuclear waste
disposal.  Under this Act, the federal government committed itself to14
providing a solution to the permanent disposal of commercial generator’s
nuclear waste.  Yucca Mountain was chosen as the government’s permanent15
disposal.  Once the Yucca Mountain facility is completed, the Department of16
Energy plans to take title to the commercial nuclear waste and manage its
disposal.  To date, the federal government has failed to fulfill its obligations17
under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and has been sued regarding its breach of
contract and has lost, with the courts rejecting its excuses and holding the
government liable for all damages caused by the excessive delays in the
completion of Yucca Mountain.18
The history detailed above portrays an industry that faces government
interference, regulation, and oversight in nearly every aspect. With so much
at stake, there will be tension between commercial entities, industry
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contractors, and federal government. When both private companies and the
federal government work together under the heavy regulation of the federal
government and for the sole purposes of federal government use, it must be
clear who will bear the responsibility for the risks. Any potential contractor
who signs on to work with the federal government for non-energy, strictly
governmental nuclear purposes needs to know before agreeing to work
whether they will be responsible for damages should any liability arise.
Additionally, the public needs a clearer distinction between the federal
government nuclear industry and the private commercial nuclear energy
industry. So many fears regarding nuclear energy actually stem from nuclear
weapons.  However, nuclear weapons and nuclear energy are not the same19
thing. Nuclear weapons and nuclear energy require different formulas or fuel,
as well as different production.  This is not to say that the public should be20
denied some form of protection in case there is a nuclear accident, but the
roles and responsibility of the private commercial sector and the federal
government need to be clearly distinguished for everyone involved, especially
the public.
III. THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT
In 1957, Congress enacted the “Price-Anderson Act” (PAA) as an
amendment to the Atomic Energy Act, to ensure the availability of “a large
pool of funds to provide for prompt and orderly compensation of members of
the public who incur damages from a nuclear or radiological incident no
matter who might be liable.”  The PAA requires indemnification contracts for21
personal injury and property damage.  This Act covers any party that may be22
legally liable. Therefore a claimant can directly sue a licensee or contractor
after a nuclear accident.  The PAA covers operation of power reactors,23
research reactors, the Department of Energy’s nuclear and radiological
facilities, and the transportation of nuclear fuel from any one of these
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facilities.24
The PAA creates a scheme of insurance pooling, which pools
contributions from all licensed nuclear facilities and requires facilities to
secure private insurance to ensure that sufficient funds are readily available
to pay for any nuclear accident.  This method spreads the risk over a “large25
financial base.”  The PAA also includes indemnifications by the DOE.26 27
This DOE indemnification: (1) provides omnibus coverage of all persons who might be
legally liable; (2) indemnifies fully all legal liability up to the statutory limit on such
liability (currently $9.43 billion for a nuclear incident in the United States); (3) covers
all DOE contractual activity that might result in a nuclear incident in the United States;
(4) is not subject to the usual limitation on the availability of appropriated funds; and
(5) is mandatory and exclusive.28
However, it was not until the 1988 amendments to the PAA that such
indemnification was mandatory.  Prior to 1988, whether to provide29
indemnification for contractors was up to the discretion of the DOE.  As of30
2005, insurance pools have paid $151 million in claims, and the Department
of Energy (DOE) has only paid $65 million.  In 2005, the Price-Anderson Act31
was renewed until 2025.32
IV. IN RE HANFORD NUCLEAR RESERVATION LITIGATION
A. Overview of the Case
The Hanford case begins with the Manhattan Project during World War
Two.  The Hanford facility, located in eastern Washington, was built to33
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manufacture plutonium for military purposes.  The government sought34
civilian contractors to operate the facility because “the government itself did
not have the expertise or resources” to do so.  E.I. DuPont was solicited by35
the government to operate the Hanford facility, and it initially refused.36
However, the government would not back down.  The government urged E.I.37
DuPont that the project was extremely important and necessary for the war
effort.  E.I. DuPont eventually agreed in the name of “patriotism” and only38
accepted one dollar as payment.  In 1946, General Electric (“GE”) took over,39
also refusing compensation.  The site emitted Iodine-131, which was known,40
even at that time, to have adverse effects on humans.  GE requested that the41
government change its regulations to allow for longer cooling times which
would decrease the I-131 emissions.  The government refused because it42
would not allow a decrease in plutonium production. GE continued to operate
the facility in accordance with the set government standards.43
In the late 1980s, the DOE created the Hanford Environmental Dose
Reconstruction Project (“HEDR”) to estimate the possible exposure of
radiation to those living around the Hanford facility.  The project found that44
possibly harmful exposure occurred from 1944 to 1946 from the consumption
of milk from cows that grazed in the area.  Upon the publication of the45
HEDR’s report, litigation ensued under the Price-Anderson Act when
individuals claiming various illnesses and property damaged sued operators
of the Hanford facility for damages.46
B. Arguments
One of the most contested issues in the Hanford case was whether E.I.
DuPont should be exempt from liability under the Price-Anderson Act
according to the federal common law government contractor exception. The
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plaintiffs sued the E.I. DuPont under Washington state tort law under a theory
of strict liability because E.I. DuPont was engaged in an abnormally
dangerous activity.  E.I. DuPont sought to use the federal contractor defense47
to fight the application of strict liability.48
E.I. DuPont argued that the federal contractor defense should apply to
them in this case and they should be dismissed as a defendant. The Court
explained in Boyle v. United Technologies that this defense grants the
government contractor the same immunity as if it were the government itself,
so long as the contractor complied strictly with the terms of the government
contract and regulations.  E.I. DuPont argued that they could not be held49
strictly liable because they were following the federal government’s orders
and the emissions were within approved levels.50
C. Court Decisions
Initially, the federal district court for the Eastern District of Washington
struck down the defense, holding that the Price-Anderson Act “displaced any
such defense as a matter of law” because the defense could not be reconciled
with the PAA.  On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the defendants raised the issue51
again whether they, as government contractors, could be exempted from
liability using the federal contractor defense.  The circuit court took a slightly52
different approach than the district court and held that the federal contractor
defense could not be applied because the defense was not “well-established”
at the time that the Price-Anderson Act was enacted and therefore, was not
included as part of the liability scheme of the act.  While, the circuit court53
agreed with E.I. DuPont that the contractor defense might extend to them as
they did operate a military production facility pursuant to government
specifications and under government orders, the court noted that it must also
consider the Price-Anderson Act before applying the defense because it is
unclear whether this Congressional Act preempts the federal common law
doctrine of federal contractor immunity.54
In reaching its decision, the circuit court used language of the Supreme
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Court in United States v. Texas  to establish the analysis for determining55
whether a federal statute preempts federal common law.  The Court in United56
States v. Texas held that if a federal statute is enacted after a common law
doctrine has been established, the federal common law will only be preempted
if the statute directly addresses the common law principle.  The rationale for57
this rule is that if the common law doctrine is “well-established,” it must be
assumed that Congress accounted for this doctrine in enacting the statute.58
The circuit court focused on the “well-established” element of the test and
determined that the federal common law defense was not well-established
when the Price-Anderson Act was enacted or when the Act was amended in
1988.  The court asserted that the defense was not recognized until Boyle,59
which was not decided until two months prior to amendment of the
Price-Anderson Act in 1988.  The court also stated that the origins of the60
federal contractor defense were irrelevant to the case at hand.61
The circuit court held that a seminal case regarding the federal contractor
defense, Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Construction Co.,  did not apply because it62
did not extend to military contractors exercising a discretionary governmental
function.  In Yearsley, the court essentially deemed contractors agents of the63
government because they had no discretion and completely followed
government specifications.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, citing64
Justice Brennan’s dissent in Boyle, held that the holding in Yearsley was
limited and not meant to extend to “discretionary acts of those who perform
service contracts.”65
The court’s issue with applying Yearsley to the Hanford case was that E.I.
DuPont was hired to do new research for the government, and that research
involved some discretion.  However, other circuit courts have extended66
Yearsley to military contractors in the years before Boyle.  Still, the court67
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maintained that the scope of the defense was not well defined until Boyle and
therefore held that it was not incorporated into the Price-Anderson Act.68
Additionally, E.I. DuPont faced another problem in applying this defense
because the emissions at issue took place during 1944 to 1946, before GE took
over and before the Atomic Energy Commission was created to regulate the
production of plutonium.  Without strict regulations, the defense is more69
difficult to apply. Admittedly, E.I. DuPont was essentially a researcher for the
government and had a lot of discretion in their research and production of
plutonium because this research had never been done before, and the concept
was new.  The government hired E.I. DuPont to pave the way in the field of70
plutonium production and nuclear weapons.  The range of potential risks was71
unknown when E.I. DuPont began its work for the government.  Regulations72
could not be created for something that did not exist at the time.
D. Side-By-Side Comparison: Boyle and Hanford
A side-by-side comparison with Boyle assists in understanding the
precedent regarding the federal contractor defense.
Hanford parallels Boyle. First, there is a strong interest in “getting the
Government’s work done.”  In Boyle, United Technologies, the federal73
contractor, worked to design and make military helicopters for the
government.  After a pilot died in a helicopter crash due to some type of74
defect, his family sued United Technologies.  The Court of Appeals reversed75
a judgment for the plaintiff, holding that United Technologies was not liable
for a design defect under the military contractor defense.  The Supreme Court76
vacated the judgment and remanded for the lower court to determine whether
the evidence was sufficient to prove the military contractor defense.  The77
Supreme Court held that to succeed under the military contractor defense, the
design must be made according to governmental standards with minimal input
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from the manufacturer and the manufacturer must have warned the
government of any dangers known to the manufacturer.78
Obviously, military equipment is very important to the defense of the
United States. However, the interest in getting the nuclear work done in
Hanford was possibly even stronger. E.I. DuPont was recruited and eventually
accepted a contract to research and produce plutonium to advance the ongoing
war effort during World War Two  with the idea that such research was79
necessary to defend the country against a possibly imminent attack.  Both of80
these cases have a very strong federal interest: national defense. National
defense is the responsibility of the federal government,  and work on that81
federal interest may lead to use of the contractor defense.
In both Boyle and Hanford, the state-imposed duty of care was
contradictory to the obligations under the government contracts. In Boyle, the
duty imposed by the state to equip helicopters in certain ways for safety was
directly contradictory to the standards set by the government contract in which
the helicopters were to be made.  Likewise, in Hanford, the state-imposed82
duty to not engage in abnormally dangerous activities clearly conflicts with
the duty imposed by the government contract to produce plutonium for nuclear
weapons, which are inherently dangerous themselves.  Finally, there is an83
interest in allowing discretion on the part of the government in such areas as
military equipment and national defense.  It makes little sense in either of84
these cases to hold the contractor liable when the government would be
immune from suit in both of these scenarios if it had simply not contracted out
the job.
The interests in Hanford and Boyle are very similar in nature,
circumstance and the need for application of the federal contractor defense.
Therefore, Hanford should be decided the same way.
2011] FEDERAL CONTRACTOR LIABILITY: THE HANFORD DECISION 181
85. Kelly A. Moore, Recent Development: The Third Circuit Expands the Government Contractor
Defense to Include Nonmilitary Contracts, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1435, 1436–37 (Fall 1994).
86. Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844 (11th Cir. 1985); Boruski v. United States, 803
F.2d 1421 (7th Cir. 1986).
87. Burgess v. Colo. Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844 (11th Cir. 1985).
88. Yearsley, 309 U.S. 18.
89. Burgess, 772 F.2d at 846.
90. Boruski v. United States, 803 F.2d 1421 (7th Cir. 1986).
91. Boyle, 487 U.S. 500.
92. Boruski, 803 F.2d 1421.
E. The Federal Contractor Defense Should Apply in This Case
1. The Defense Was Established at the Time the Price-Anderson Act Was
Enacted
The Ninth Circuit may be correct in deciding that the federal contractor
defense for military contracts was not solidified until the Supreme Court ruled
in Boyle, but this does not necessarily mean that the defense did not exist and
was not being used by other courts before Boyle. The analysis by the Ninth
Circuit of the precedent regarding the federal contractor defense is superficial
at best. The federal contractor defense was established and used in multiple
courts in various capacities for both military and nonmilitary contracts before
the Price-Anderson Act was amended in 1988.  Before Boyle was decided,85
two cases had extended the federal contractor defense to nonmilitary
contracts.  In 1985, the Eleventh Circuit applied the defense in Burgess v.86
Colorado Serum Co.,  which did not involve a military contract. In that case,87
the court cited Yearsley  and reasoned that,88
Both the history of the defense and its general rationale lead us to the conclusion that it
would be illogical to limit the availability of the defense solely to “military” contractors.
If a contractor has acted in the sovereign’s stead and can prove the elements of the
defense, then he should not be denied the extension of sovereign immunity that is the
government contract defense.89
The Seventh Circuit also applied the federal contractor defense to nonmilitary
contracts in Boruski v. United States,  two years before the Supreme Court90
clearly established the defense in Boyle.  In that case the Seventh Circuit91
applied the government contractor defense to claims arising out of a
government vaccine program.92
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Not only was the federal contractor defense applied to nonmilitary
contracts before 1988, but the court in Burgess  also cited eight different93
cases in various jurisdictions between the years of 1982 and 1985 that applied
the federal contractor defense to military contracts.  This list demonstrates94
that regardless of whether the specifics of the defense were not completely
outlined in one case until Boyle,  the defense was clearly established, used95
and applied by courts across the country well before Congress made the
amendments to the PAA in 1988. Additionally, the idea of government or
sovereign immunity stems back much further than the enactment of the
Price-Anderson Act and it was not until 1948, with the passage of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, that the federal government waived its immunity with regard
to tort liability.  In other words, there is historically a presumption against96
government liability, and where such liability exists, it was imposed by the
government itself. With so much precedent, it is highly unlikely that Congress
would overlook this defense or the ramifications of governmental immunity
when passing the PAA or its amendments.
2. Congressional Intent of the Price-Anderson Act Does Not Contradict the
Application of Federal Contractor Defense
The focus in the opinion of United States v. Texas  was not on whether97
the federal common law was “well-established,” but rather on the
congressional intent in enacting the statute.  However, the status of the98
federal common law was not in question in that case. Nevertheless, the Court
emphasized a presumption of favoring the common law defense.  The Court99
stated that unless the statute directly addresses the status of the federal
common law or the statutory purpose is clearly contrary to the federal
common law, the federal common law would not be preempted by the federal
statute.  The Court looked for any congressional intent to displace the100
common law and the overall purpose of the act in question.  In order to101
follow the reasoning of the Supreme Court the Ninth Circuit should refocus
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its analysis in Hanford. Instead of focusing on whether the federal law was
“well-established,” the court should have focused on the Congressional
legislative intent and purpose behind the Price-Anderson Act.
The federal contractor defense is not necessarily contradictory to the
Price-Anderson Act. The underground detonations clause of the PAA, Section
2210(d)(7), explicitly addresses defenses.  This clause states that an102
indemnified contractor will be held liable for underground denotations and no
“immunity or defense founded in the Federal, State or municipal character of
the contractor or of the work to be performed under the contract shall be
effective to bar such liability.”  Again, the Ninth Circuit merely provided a103
superficial analysis of the issue. The court minimizes this clause in the PAA
as “not clear.”  However, by looking at the plain language of the clause, it104
is clear that Congress wanted to drive home the point that no matter what the
circumstances, any person who engages in underground detonations will be
held liable.  This clause specifically refers to “contractors” and states that105
“no immunity or defense” may be used.106
The court also stated that “[e]ven assuming, however that Congress
intended to ensure that the modern defense did not apply to underground
detonations claims, it does not follow that Congress also intended, without
saying so, that the defense would apply in all other situations.”  Clearly,107
Congress felt the need to specifically address defenses in regard to
underground detonations for a reason, and it can reasonably be inferred that
if a defense is explicitly banned in these circumstances, it is applicable in
other circumstances unless otherwise specified.
Another section of the PAA also addresses governmental immunity.
Section 2210(n) of the PAA addresses the “Waivers of Defenses and Judicial
Procedures.”  This section explicitly addresses a defense of governmental108
immunity, which can be incorporated into indemnity agreements with
contractors.109
Regardless, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Price-Anderson Act does not directly address the federal contractor defense
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and is essentially silent regarding the defense.  Therefore, the court had to110
determine whether the defense would clearly conflict with the Act.  A111
defense will be preempted only if it clearly conflicts with the Act.  In this112
case, the court held that the federal contractor defense clearly conflicted with
the PAA and was preempted.113
The purpose of the Price-Anderson Act, as initially enacted in 1957, was
to cover the liability of commercial reactors.  The Price-Anderson Act itself114
states its purpose in § 2012(i):
In order to protect the public and to encourage the development of the atomic energy
industry, in the interest of the general welfare and of the common defense and security,
the United States may make funds available for a portion of the damages suffered by the
public from nuclear incidents, and may limit the liability of those persons liable for such
losses.115
“The main purpose of the Price-Anderson Act is to ensure the availability of
a large pool of funds . . . to provide prompt and orderly compensation of
members of the public who incur damages from a nuclear or radiological
incidence not matter who might be liable.”116
From the PAA’s stated purpose, it does not appear that legal liability was
the focus of the PAA. If the purpose of the Price-Anderson Act is to ensure
that adequate insurance is provided so that the injured public can recover their
damages quickly, then the federal contractor defense does not directly conflict
with the PAA. Essentially, the Price-Anderson Act and the federal contractor
defense cover two different spheres: insurance/funding for damages and legal
liability. Since these spheres do not conflict, the second part of the United
States v. Texas test is met and the federal law will not be preempted.117
Another point to consider is the fact that until 1988, the Price-Anderson
Act did not require that DOE contractors be indemnified under the Act.  This118
fact is further evidence of congressional intent in the Act. Clearly, the focus
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of the PAA was on commercial reactors and their potential liability, not on
federal DOE contractors and certainly not on contractors such as E.I. DuPont
who were out of the picture long before the PAA was enacted. It was not until
the 1988 amendments to the PAA that all DOE contracts were required to
include indemnification schemes.119
According to precedent, Congressional silence regarding an issue in a
piece of legislation is supposed to provide an assumption that Congress did
not intend to “supplant the existing common law” unless there is a direct
statement in the legislation regarding the common law.  “Congress’s mere120
refusal to legislate with respect to” the federal contractor defense does not
demonstrate an intent to overturn the federal common law.  The Ninth121
Circuit, however, does not make this mandatory assumption in Hanford.
Instead, it discards the language and basic purpose of the Price-Anderson Act,
assumes that Congress was silent regarding the defense, and held that the
federal contractor defense is clearly contradictory to the intent of the
Price-Anderson Act and therefore the defense is preempted.122
This approach taken by the Ninth Circuit is casual and superficial. The
fact that the statute does have some specific language regarding applicable
defenses, coupled with the fact that the Price-Anderson Act was initially
established to limit liability for private commercial reactors, demonstrates that
Congress did not intend the federal contractor defense to be preempted, and
the defense should be applied in the Hanford case.
F. Other Issues to Consider Before Refusing to Apply the Federal
Contractor Defense
Timing must seriously be considered. E.I. DuPont signed on to run the
Hanford facility for the federal government in the early 1940s as part of the
“war effort.” This was over ten years before the Price-Anderson Act was
enacted. This ten year difference is very important for several reasons.
First, E.I. DuPont’s work at the Hanford facility began and ended long
before the PAA was enacted. Therefore, any emissions that caused later
damages occurred long before the PAA was in force. Also, E.I. DuPont did
not get the privilege of considering any liability scheme or government
indemnification before accepting the job at the Hanford site. Additionally,
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even if the PAA were in place when E.I. DuPont accepted the position,
mandatory indemnification of contractors was not part of the PAA until 1988.
E.I. DuPont had no reason to assume that it would be held strictly liable for
the work it was to perform under the auspices of the federal government.
Nuclear energy was not in the picture at this point, and any nuclear work in
terms of weapons research was solely being done by the U.S. government. The
latter point is still true today. Nuclear weapons research, production and use
are not commercial in any aspect and are strictly controlled and performed by
the federal government. The only difference today is that any DOE contractors
would have indemnification clauses in their contracts. E.I. DuPont would
never have gotten involved in the Hanford project but-for the urging of the
government and the need of the government for contractors to perform nuclear
research in the wake of war. From this perspective, it seems that the federal
government should be solely responsible for any damages to the Hanford
plaintiffs because the Hanford project was initiated by the government, and
during the time that E.I. DuPont was involved, the project was overseen and
run strictly for governmental purposes.
Second, as explained in the Department of Energy’s report to Congress
prior to the 2002 expiration of the Price-Anderson Act, “the Price-Anderson
Act imposes strict liability by requiring the waiver of any defenses related to
conduct of the claimant or fault of any person indemnified.”  These waivers123
are laid out in § 2210(n) of the PAA. This section states that the government
may incorporate provisions into their contracts that mandate the waiver of
defenses or government immunity. Today, government contractors working
in similar situations to E.I. DuPont may be required to waive the federal
contractor defense and expose themselves to strict liability under their
contract. But, in return, they will be indemnified by the government for
anything that should happen due to their work on the governmental contract.
E.I. DuPont did not waive any defense or governmental immunity in its
contract with the government. This clause in the new contracts is apparently
meant to allow for imposition of strict liability under state tort law.  But, if124
there is no waiver of a defense, such as in E.I. DuPont’s case, governmental
immunity or other defense should be permissible to rebut an imposition of
strict liability.
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V. CONCLUSION
E.I. DuPont was not running the Hanford site for any commercial
purpose. It did not even accept payment for its work because that work was
done in the name of “patriotism.” No commercial entity was involved in the
site during the time in which the plaintiffs in the E.I. DuPont case were
injured. Therefore, application of the federal contractor defense would clearly
define the line between the federal government’s responsibility in the nuclear
industry and that of the commercial sector. Application of the federal
contractor defense would clearly state, “this was the government’s
responsibility.”
The 1988 amendment involving mandatory indemnification was
important because it showed that the government is expected to step up and
take responsibility for its conduct within the nuclear industry regardless of
whether it does the work and research itself or whether it hires someone else
to do it. Additionally, without such indemnification, the highly skilled
contractors whom the government would seek to do any such work in the
nuclear field would be very hesitant to sign on if they could be held
responsible for doing what the government mandates they do according to
their contract. And without these highly skilled contractors the government
would be unable to proceed with much of its critical nuclear work.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to deny application of the federal contractor
defense to this case was wrong. The defense clearly existed prior to the 1988
amendments to the Price-Anderson Act, the Act does not bar the defense, and
application of the defense would not contradict the purpose of the
Price-Anderson Act. E.I. DuPont should benefit from application of the
federal contractor defense in this case.
